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552 HALLETT V. SLAUGHTER [22 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 18369. In Bank. July 23, 1943.] 
GLADYS MEYER HALLETT, Respondent, v. J. A. 
SLAUGHTER et al., Appellants. 
[1] Judgments - Equitable Relief-Evidence-Suffi.ciency-Mail-
ing of Answer.-In an action to vacate a default judgment 
rendered against plaintiff as a defendant in another action, 
the evidence supported a finding that her answer and a copy 
thereof were mailed on the day following that on which she 
was served with a copy of the summons and complaint in the 
other action, where the attorney employed by plaintiff to de-
fend her in such action testi:6.ed that he handed these papers, 
together with the :6.ling fee, to his secretary, and instructed 
the latter to mail the original answer and the fee to the clerk 
of the court and to mail the copy to opposing counsel, and 
where the secretary testi:6.ed that she did not recall the mat-
ter, but that if the papers had been given her to mail, then 
she had mailed them.' . 
[2] Appeal ..,... Right of Review -- Compliance With Judgment: 
Judgments - Opening and Vacating-Effect of -Subsequent 
Proceedings.-The enforced satisfaction of a judgment does 
not deprive the judgment debtor of the right to appeal or to 
seek to have the judgment vacated or set aside. A stipulation, 
made by such debtor for the purpose of securing the release 
of her salary held under levy ·of execution, and her affidavit 
claiming exemption of her salary held under a subsequent levy, 
did not defeat' her right to maintain an action to vacate the 
judgment, where both the stipulation and the claim of exemp-
tion were involuntary steps forced upon her. 
[3a, 3b] Judgments - Equitable Relief-Proceedings-Laches.-
In an action to vacate a default judgment rendered against 
plaintiff as a defendant in another action, plaintiff was not 
guilty of neglect, laches and want of diligence precluding re-
lief, although some degree of negligence might be charged to 
her attorney in not sooner discovering that her answer had not 
been :6.led in the other action, where her delay in discovering 
the entry of default was due in part to defendants' failure to 
[2] See 2 Ca1.Jur. 227; 14 Cal.Jur. 1018. 
[3] See 10 Ca1.Jur. 530; 15 Ca1.Jur. 35; 19 Am.Jur. 352; 31 Am. 
Jur.278. • 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 275; [2] Appeal and 
Error, § 104; Judgments, § 154; [3] Judgments, § 265;[4] Judg-
ments, § 253 j [5] Judgments, § 233. 
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take. earlier action to enforce their judgment, where the pres-
ent suit was commenced within a few weeks after plaintiff 
learned of the mistake and has been diligently prosecuted by 
her, and where defendants have not shown that they .have suf-
fered injury as a result of the delay before plaintiff knew of 
the mistake. 
[4] Id. - Equitable Relief - Grounds-Accident and Mista.ke.-
EqUity will relieve an injure'd party from the effect of It de-
fault judgment, where complainant was prevented by extrinsic 
accident and mistake of fact from presenting her defimse in 
the action in which such judgment was rendered, and where 
she was not guilty of negligence or laches. _ " .. 
[5lId. - Equitable Relief - Limitations on Righ~DefenBeon 
Merits.-While equity will not ordinarily interfere with Ii judg~ 
ment which is unjust unless it appears that' the . one whose 
interests were infringed can present a meritorlQUS case, the 
complainant need not allege a defense which can be. guaranteed 
to prevail at a trial, but need only show with reasonablecer-
tainty that a new trial would result in a judgment more favor-
able to her than that sought to be set aside. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Meyer B. Marion, Judge pro tem. Affirmed. 
Action to vacate a default judgment. - Judgment for 
plaintiff affirmed. 
Herbert Gall and Edward Fitzpatrick for Appellants. 
David I. Lippert for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-Defendants appeal from a·decree in equity 
setting aside and vacating a judgnlent by default secured 
against plaintiff in an action filed on April 17, 1940, in the 
Muni~ipal Court of Los Angeles, and based on an assigned 
claim for medical services allegedly furnished by Dr. Walter 
B. Schwuchow (since deceased) to plaintiff and her son. In 
that action defendants herein, Slaughter and Trigg, as oper-
ators of a collection agency named The Doctors Business 
Bureau, were plaintiffs and plaintiff herein was a defendant. 
In· the instant suit plaintiff herein was.also awarded a moriey 
judgment against defendants for certain sums which defen-
[5] See 15 Cal.Jur. 29. 
) : 
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dants had t:lollected from her by means of levies upon her 
salary, under the municipal court judgment; enforcement of 
the municipal court judgment was enjoinea; and the munici-
pal court was ordered to permit plaintiff to .file her answer 
in that court within ten days after judgment in the present 
suit becomes final. Defendant Jennie 1. Schwuchow was 
joined as the widow of Dr. Schwuchow and executrix of his 
estate. We have conclud.ed that the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
It appears from the evidence and was found by the court 
that on May 23, 1940, plaintiff was served with a copy of the 
summons and complaint in the municipal court action; that 
she forthwith employed an attorney to represent her in such 
action, and her answer to the complaint therein, prepared by 
her attorney and verified by her, and accompanied by the 
requisite filing fee, was on May 24, 1940, deposited in the 
United States mail at Los Angeles, California, enclosed in an 
envelope with sufficient postage affixed, and directed to the 
clerk of the Municipal Court of Los Angeles; that on the same 
day a copy of the answer was mailed to the attorney for 
plaintiffs in the municipal court action (defendants herein) ; 
that neither the original nor the copy of the answer was 
received by the respective addressees or returned to this plain-
tiff's attorney, but both were lost; that plaintiff imd her attor-
ney believed the answer was on file. On June 4, 1940, the. 
default of plaintiff herein WstS entered in the municipal court 
action, and on December 27, 1940, judgment by default was 
taken against her. 
Early in January, 1941, execution was levied upon plain-
tiff's salary. This was the first knowledge leceived by either 
plaintiff or her attorney that her answer had not reached the 
clerk of the court and had not been filed, that her default had' 
been entered, and that judgment had been taken against her. 
Plaintiff sought release of her salary by filing a claim of 
exemption under the provisions of section 690.11 of the COIle 
of Civil Procedure, but before the claim was heard by the 
court plaintiff stipulated with the judgment creditors that 
they take half of the money under levy and that she receive 
the other half. Early in February, 1941, defendants levied 
upon plaintiff's salary a second time, and plaintiff stipulated 
that they take $50 of the amount held. On February 24, 1941, 
plaintiff filed this suit. A third salary levy was made in 
March, 1941 j plaintiff again filed a claim of exemption j and 
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after a hearing the court ordered that plaintiff was entitled 
to half. the money and that defendants take the other half. 
The trial court further found that plaintiff has a meritori~ 
ous defense to the municipal court action but that, by the 
accidental loss, of her answer and the mistaken belief on her 
part and on the part of her attorney that the answer was on 
file, she was prevented from setting up such defense; that the 
loss of the answer and the mistaken belief that it was on file 
were "not due to any fault or neglect" of plaintiff or of her 
attorney; that they "had the right to rely on the United States 
Post Office" to transmit the answer as directed; that plaintiff 
was diligent in bringing the present suit and was not guilty 
of laches; and that plaintiffs, in the municipal court action 
(defendants herein) willfully and with the intent to lull this 
plaintiff into a false sense of security, refrained from pro.: 
ceeding in that action until plaintiff's rights under section 
473 of the Code of Civil Procedure were barred by lapse of 
time, although "they knew that plaintiff's ... salary pay-
ments were vulnerable to such proceedings." 
Defendants' contentions are four: 
1. That the evidence fails to support th~ finding that plain-
tiff's answer and the copy thereof were mailed (as set forth 
above). 
2. That by her stipulation made for the purpose of securing. 
the release of her salary held under levy of execution, and by 
her affidavit of exemption made following the March salary 
levy and after the present suit was filed, plaintiff ratified and 
confirmed the municipal court judgment and is now estopped 
to attack it. . 
3. That plaintiff is guilty of neglect, of laches, and of want 
of diligence, and therefore is not entitled to equitable relief. 
4. That plaintiff failed to show that she has a meritorious 
defense and that a new trial would result in a judgment more 
favorable to r.' 
[1] As to defendants' first, contention, the attorney em-
ployed by this plaintiff to defend her in the municipal court 
aetion testified that on May 24, 1940, he handed plaintiff's 
answer and a copy thereof, together with the filing fee, to his 
secretary,and instructed her to mail the original answer and 
the filing fee to the clerk of the municipal court and to mail 
the copy to opposing counsel. The secretary testified that she 
did not recall the matter, but that if the papers had been 
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given her to mail, then she had mailed them, and that she 
knew "there was sufficient postage because we had a scale. 
r couldn't go wrong in that." This testimony supports the 
finding that the papers were mailed .. 
[2] Defendants' second contention is answered by the 
rule, well settled in California, that the enforced satisfaction 
of a judgment does not deprive the judgment debtor of the 
right to appeal or to seek to have the judgment vacated or set 
aside. (See 14 Cal.Jur. 1018, sec. 84, and cases there cited; 
Engelken v. Justice Oourt (1920),50 Cal.App. 157, 159 [195 
P. 265]; and Hartke v. Abbott (1930), 106 Cal.App. 388, 
391-393 [289 P. 206].) Plaintiff's stipulations went no furthel: 
than to specify the amount which was to be paid each of the 
respective parties to the judgment from the money held under 
levy, and contain no suggestion of a compromise agreement, 
of an affirmance of the judgment; or of a waiver of the right 
to attack it. They were made for the sole purpose of securing 
a prompt release to plaintiff of a portion of the money, and 
cannot now be held to defeat her right to maintain this suit. 
The same is true of plaintiff's affidavit claiming exemption 
of her salary held under the levy made in March j the claim 
of exemption and the subsequent court hearing thereon were 
involuntary steps forced upon plaintiff in the same manner 
as were the stipulations. 
[3a] Defendants' third point-that because of neglect, 
laches, and want of diligence plaintiff may not seek relief from 
equity-is met by the findings of the trial court to the con-
trary on each of these issues. Although some degree of negli~ 
gence may be charged to the' .attorney employed by this 
plaintiff to defend her in the municipal court action in not 
sooner discovering that plaintiff's answer had not been filed, 
we are uot prepared to say that his remissness in this regard 
amounts to such inexcusable neglect as a matter of law that 
plaintiff should be foreclosed of her right to maintain this 
suit. Moreover, plaintiff's delay in discovering the entry of 
her default was due i~ part at least to the apparently designed 
and deliberate failurc of defenaauts to take earlier action to 
secure and enforce their judgment. Weare in accord with 
the following vicws set forth in Soule v. Bacon (1907), 150 
Cal. 495, 497-498 [89 P. 324] : "There are many cases holding 
that the party may have relief in equity from the conse-
quences of his mistake of fact, although he was somewhat 
negligent in making the mistake, if his negligence in no way 
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prejudiced the opposIng party. [Citations.] .. At most, it 
was a question of fact for the court below to determine 
whether or not the lack of vigilance on the part of the plain-
tiff was such as would not have occurrcd with a man of ordinary 
care and prudence, under the same circumstances. That court 
has decided the question in favor of the plaintiff, and we are 
sati<;fied with its conclusion." 
[4] Plaintiff was prevented by extrinsic accident and mis-
take of fact from presenting her defense in the municipal 
court action. That such accident and mistake furnish a 
ground for equitable intervention under the circumstances of 
this case is clear. (See Bidleman v. Kcwen (1852), 2 Cal. 248, 
250 j Bibendv. Kreutz (1862), 20 Cal. 109, 110, 114 j Brackett 
v. Banegas (1897),116 Cal. 278, 284 [48 P. 90,'58 Am:St.Rep. 
164] j Bacon v. Bacon (1907), 150 Cal. 477,481, 486, 491 [89 
P. 317] j Wattson v. Dillon (1936), 6 Cal.2d 33, 40 [56 P.2d 
220] j Olivera v. Grace (1942), 19 Ca1.2d 570, 578 [122 P~2d 
564, 140 A.L.R. 1328]; Boyle v. Boyle (1929), 97 Cal.App. 
703,706 [276 P. 118] j Jeffords v. Young (1929),98 Cal.App. 
400, 404 [277 P. 163] j Winn v. Torr (1938), 27 Cal.App.3d 
623,627 [81 P.2d 457] j Wil.son v. Wilson (1942), 55 Cal.App. 
2d 421, 426 [130P.2d 782].) . . , 
[3b] This suit was commenced within a few weeks a~ter, 
plaintiff learned of the mistake and has been dilig~ntly prose-
cuted by her. In addition, defendants have not shown that 
thev have suffered injury as a result of the delay before plain-
tiff· knew of the mistake (a delay wb;ich, as llj.entionedabove, 
was caused in part by defendants' own conduct), and there-
fore one element of laches ·is missing. (See 10 Cal.Jur. 530, 
sec. 68, and cases there cited.) '. , 
[5] The fourth contention .of defendants-that plaintiff 
fniled· to show a meritorious defense-is also without founda-
tion. Among the facts alleged by plaintiff by way of defense 
to the municipal court action are: that a major portion of the 
account there sucd upon was for services to her son, Eugene, 
at a time when he was a minor, rather than to herself, and 
that for I'mch services her obligation to the doctor, if any, was 
as guardian of the estate of her son, rather than individually j 
that the charges for such services "had been barred by the 
statnte of limitations"; that the doctor had released and dis~ 
charged her from all liability prior to commencement of the 
municipal court action j that her obligation to the doctor, if 
any, had been discharged in tankruptcy; and that neither she 
.. 
558 HALLETT V. SLAUGHTER [22 C.2d 
nor her son had been acquainted with the doctor or under his 
care during certain months covered by the account. Proof of 
even a portion of these allegation:3 would result in a judgment 
in the municipal court action which would be more favorable 
to this plaintiff than that which was entered by default. As 
stated in Olivera v. Grace (1942), supra, 19 Cal.2d 570,579, 
"The requirement that the complaint allege a meritorious 
ca.c:;e does not require an absolute guarantee of 7ictory." The 
same observation may be made concerning the proof produced 
by plaintiff in support of her allegations; she need .only show 
with reasonable certainty that she would emerge ill a more 
favorable position. (See 15 Cal.Jur. 29, sec. 128, and cas.es 
there cited.) The trial court heard the testimony of plaintIff 
and concluded that she has a meritorious defense to the 
municipal court action and that "if the judgment therein is 
set aside it appears that a like judgment would not follow; 
that on the contrary it is reasonably certain that a judgment 
more favorable to this plaintiff would result." Such a show-
ing is all that is required of plaintiff in order to secure 
eq~itable intervention and an opportunity for a full heari~g 
on the merits. To require in thic:; suit complete proof ill 
establishment of her defenses would render idle the act of 
conducting a trial on the merits inthe municipal court action. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The present action is an independent suit in equity com-
menced after the expiration of the time for rclief under sec-
tion 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Title Ins. &7 Trust 
Co. v. King etc. Co., 162 Cal. 44 [120 P. 1066] ; Hunt, Mirk 
&7 Co., Inc. v. Hesperides Mining Co., 200 Cal. 382 [253 P. 
317] . Knox v. Superior Court, 100 Cal.App. 452, 454 [~80 
P. 375].) The remedy afforded by section 473 is akin to the 
common law power of courts to vacate their own judgments 
during the term they were rendered. (Olivera v. Grace, 19 
Oal.2d 570, 574 [122 P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328].) For the 
mORt part the cases cited by plaintiff granting relief for the 
loss or delay of a pleading in the mails arose under statutes 
different from those existing in this state and involved re-
quests for such relief made in the same action shortly after 
the entry of the default. (Chicago ctc. Co. v. Eastham., 26 
Okla. 605 [110 P. 887 i 30 L.R.A.N.S. 740] i Boyd v. Williams, 
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70 N.J.L. 185 [56 A. 135] i Norman v. Iowa Central Ry. Co., 
149 Iowa 246 [128 N.W. 349] ; Corning v. Tripp, (N.Y.) 1 
How.Pr. 14; Locb v. Schmith, 1 Mont. 87; Williams v. Rich-
mond etc. Co., 110 N.C. 466 [15 S.E. 97].) It is not enough 
now 'for plaintiff to show that the judgment was taken against 
her through a "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect," that would have entitled her to relief under the I>ro-
visions of section 473 had she made timely application there-
for. (Olivera v. Grace, supra.) She must prove that bee:ause 
of extrinsic fra.ud or mistake she had no reasonable oppor~ 
tunity to present her defense (Olivera v. Grace, supra; West~ 
phalv. Westphal, 20 Ca1.2d 393, 397 [126 P.2d 105}'iNeblett 
v. Pacific Mutual L. Ins. Co., ante, pp. 393, 397-398 [139,P.21l 
934] i Larrabee v. Tracy, 21 Cal.2d 645, 649 [134 P.2d 265] ; 
Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [89 P. 317] ; see Restatement, 
Judgments, secs. 118-126), and that she has not been neg1i~ 
gent in failing to discover the fraud or mistake. (Wattson 
v. Dillon, 6 Cal.2d 33 [56 P.2d 220]; Wilson v. Wilson, 55 
Cal.App.2d 421, 427 [130 P.2d 782], and cases there cited.) 
The plaintiff has not shown that defendants are guilty. of 
fraud. The trial court's finding that defendants, with intent 
to lull plaintiff into a false sense of security, wilfully re-
frained from undertaking any proceedings in the action until 
more than six months after the entry of default, is not a 
finding of fraud, for defendants owed plaintiff no duty to 
notify her of the entry or to inform her of her legal rights. 
(Code of Civ. Proc., secs. 585, 1010, 1014; Bley v. Dessin, 31 
Cal.App.2d 338, 343 [87 P.2d 889] ; Trustees o/Amherst Col. 
lege v. Allen, 165 Mass. 178 [42 N.E. 570].) Defendants di~ 
nothing to deceive plaintiff, nor were they in any way respon-
sible for the loss of plaintiff's answer or for her belief that it 
had been filed. (See Wattson v. Dillon, 6 Ca1.2d33, 42-43 
[56 P.2d 220].) They had a clear legal right to delay the 
entry and enforcement of the judgment and their motive in 
doing so is immaterial. Plaintiff herself rejects fraud as the 
basis of her action by characterizing the action in her brief 
on appeal as one "to set aside a default judgment obtaine~ 
. . . as a result of mistake and accident." 
The mistake in the present case was the erroneous belief of 
plaintiff and her attorney in the earlier action that her answer 
was on file, prompted by the failure of the attorney to file an 
answer with the clerk of the court. (Code of Civ. Proc. sec. 
465.) One who is remiss in presenting his case to ~he court, 
, 
. ; 
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however, is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of setting 
aside a final judgment. (Wattson v. Dillon, sttpra; Wilson v. 
Wilson, supra; Borland v. Thornton, 12 Cal. 440; Quinn v. 
Wetherbee, 41 Cal. 242"; Restatement, JUdgments, sees. 1, 
126.) Admittedly the answer was never delivered to the 
clerk, but plaintiff contends that it was mailed and that she 
was not responsible for its accidental loss. Mailing, however, 
is not equivalent to filing. (McDonald v. Lee, 132 Cal. 252 
[64 P. 250]; Estes v. Chimes, 40 Cal.App.2d 41 [104 P.2d 
74] ; see United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 [36 S.Ct. 
508, 60 L.Ed. 897]; Poynor v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 81 F.2d 521, 522.) "Filing a paper consists in pre-
senting it at the proper office, and leaving it there, deposited 
with the papers in such office .... A paper in' a case is said 
to be filed when it is delivered to the clerk and received by 
him, to be kept with the papers in the cause." (Tre-
gambo v. Comanche M.' & M. Co., 57 Cal. 501, 506; see 
Cox v. Tyrone Power Enterprises, 49 Cal.App.2d 383, 395 
[121 P.2d 829].) It is the duty of a litigant to see that his 
pleading is in fact deposited in the clerk's office within the 
time contemplated by law. (Tregambo v. Comanche M. & M. 
Co., supra; Boyd v. Desmond, 79 Cal. 250, 253 [21 P. 755] ; 
Hoyt v. Stark, 134 Cal. 178, 180·181 [66 P. 223, 86 Am.St. 
Rep. 246]; Fletcher v. Maginnis, 136 Cal. 362, 363 [68 P. 
1015] ; W. J. White Co. v. Winton, 41 Cal.App. 693, 695 [183 
P. 277].) When he engages an attorney, the latter becomes 
his agent in prosecuting' the suit and must on his behalf 
perform the duties that the law imposes upon a litigant, and 
the attorney's failure to do so is chargeable to his client. 
(Wilson v. Wilson, supra; United States v. Duesdiekcr, 118 
Cal.App. 723 ,[5P. 2d 916] ; Jeffords v. Young, 98 Cal. App. 
400 [277 P. 163] ; see 14 Cal.Jur. 1042-1043; 34 C.J. 307-309; 
1 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.), p. 495.) Thus if an 
attorney fails to file an answer (Borland v. Thornton, supra) , 
or fails to find and correct an error in ,the record on appeal 
(Quinn v. Wetherbee, s1J,pra) , equity will deny the client's 
application to set aside the judgment. Cases such as Brackett 
v. Banegas, 116 Cal. 278 [48 P. 90, 58 Am.St.Rep. 164], and 
Winn v. Torr, 27 Cal.App. 2d, 623 [81 P.2d 457], were not 
suits in equity to set aside a final judgment but actions to 
foreclose a mortgage, and rest upon the principle that since 
a mortgagee is entitled to an effectual foreclosure he is not 
precluded from bringing a new action to foreclose his lien 
by an earlier suit that failed of that purpose . 
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Cases in which the court or its attachl'S (Sullivan v. Lums-
de"" 118 Cal. 664, 668-669 [50 P. 777]; Herd v, Tuohy, 133 
Cal. 55, 62-63 [65P. 139]), or the other party (Olivera v. 
Grace, supra; Boyle v. BO"Jle, 97 Cal.App. 703 [276 P. 118] ; 
Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [89 P. 317]; Soule v. Bacon, 
150 Cal. 495 [89 P. 324] ; Bidleman v. Kewen, 2 Cal. 248; 
Bibend v. Kreutz, 20 Cal. 109; Antonsen v. Pacific Container 
Co., 48 Cal.App.2d 535, 538-539 [120 P.2d 148]) isrcspon-
sible for the mistake are of no avail to plaintiff, for the 
mistake was solely that of plaintiff and her counsel. Equity 
will in certain cases relieve 11 complainant from, an adverse 
judgment resulting from his own, mistake (see Jeffords v. 
Young, supra), but it will not relieve him if he fails to 
present his case with the, diligence required, of a litignnt. 
(Wilson v. Wilson, supra; Borland v. Thornton, supra; Watt-
son v. Dillon, supraj Quinn v. Wetherbee, supra.) Defendant 
assumed the risk that her answer might not reach the elerk 
of the court when it was sent' to him by mail. As time p~:scd 
there was no acknowledgment of the copy sent to, opposing 
connsel, or any other sign to indicate that either the answer 
or the copy had been received, but nothing was done to 
ascertain whether the answer had in fact been delivered to 
the clerk. After six months had elapsed following the entry 
of default, plaintiff's attorney had still made no inquiry as 
'to the progress of the case or as to whether the answer had 
been filed, nor did he examine the records of the case on file 
in the office of the clerk. The attorney's office was only a 
few blocks from the courthouse and he could readily have 
checked the records in the clerk's office. Even a telephone 
inquiry would have disclosed the ~rue' status of thecas~. 
Plaintiff' must be charged with his failure to ascertlim 
whether the answer had been filed. (Wattson .v.D'/.'ZZon;.supNJ,; 
Rudy v. SZotwinsky, 73 Cal.App. 459 [238 P,: :783].) .. ' ... -
In my opinion the trial court erred insetting aside the 
judgment of the municipal court, and also erred in granting 
plaintiff judgment for the sums collected by the defendants. 
The judgment should therefore be reversed. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied Ailgust 19, 
1943. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor,J., voted. for. 
a rehearing. 
